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Probate Law Meets the Digital Age
Naomi Cahn*
This Article explores the impact of federal law on a state fiduciary’s
management of digital assets. It focuses on the lessons from the Stored
Communications Act (“SCA”), initially enacted in 1986 as one part of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act. Although Congress designed the
SCA to respond to concerns that Internet privacy posed new dilemmas with
respect to application of the Fourth Amendment’s privacy protections, the
drafters did not explicitly consider how the SCA might affect property
management and distribution. The resulting uncertainty affects anyone with
an email account.
While existing trusts and estates laws could legitimately be interpreted
to encompass the new technologies, and while the laws applicable to these new
technologies could be interpreted to account for wealth transfer, we are
currently in a transition period. To fulfill their obligations, however,
fiduciaries need certainty and uniformity. The article suggests reform to
existing state and federal laws to ensure that nonprobate-focused federal laws
ultimately effectuate the decedent’s intent. The lessons learned from examining
the intersection of federal law focused on digital assets and of state fiduciary
law extend more broadly to show the unintended consequences of other
nonprobate-focused federal laws.
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I. INTRODUCTION

At the most basic level, state wealth-transfer law is designed to
effectuate the donor’s intent. 1 Default rules, including intestacy and
elective share statutes, foster these fundamental policies. Probate
administration regimes facilitate collection of the decedent’s assets
and protect the rights of the beneficiaries designated by the testator or
those whom the state assumes would have been chosen. Developments
in state trust law, respect for nonprobate transfers, and fiduciary
obligations similarly effectuate the donor’s intent. These intenteffectuating policies are at the core of the trusts and estates canon. 2
To be sure, there are countervailing state policies, including antidiscrimination laws, taxation, and override rules such as the elective
share protecting the state fisc, 3 but these are recognized as exceptions
to the basic principle of promoting the donor’s intent. States have
adopted and adapted laws, ranging from revocation-on-divorce
statutes to intestacy systems, to reflect local variations in
presumptions concerning what the decedent actually prefers.
Federal law, by contrast, is typically a blunter instrument. The
potential intersection between the two systems of law occurs both
when Congress initially enacts the legislation and then when courts
interpret its applicability to trusts and estates issues. In the trusts
1.
See, e.g., John H. Langbein, Destructive Preemption of State Wealth Transfer Law in
Beneficiary Designation Cases: Hillman Doubles Down on Egelhoff, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1665, 1670
(2014) (“[T]he dominant policy of American wealth transfer law . . . is to give effect to the
intention of the transferor.”).
2.
See, e.g., Naomi Cahn & Amy Ziettlow, “Making Things Fair”: An Empirical Study of
How People Actually Approach the Wealth Transmission Process, ELDER L.J. (forthcoming 2015).
3.
The elective share (while it incorporates other goals) serves as an example of an
override policy that protects the state budget from the claims of impoverished surviving spouses.
See also Cynthia Grant Bowman, Social Science and Legal Policy: The Case of Heterosexual
Cohabitation, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 44 (2007) (discussing the privatization of partner
dependence).
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and estates field, federal law might play one of a variety of roles along
a continuum: at one end, federal law might explicitly preempt state
law, while at the other end, federal law might be irrelevant to state
trusts and estates law (as is most often true). Between these two
points, federal law can either work in tandem with or hamper state
law.
Indeed, the federal government sometimes does recognize the
potential impact of federalism principles on state inheritance law and
may explicitly defer to state wealth-transfer law both substantively
and jurisdictionally. The probate exception embodies such deference; 4
in addition, various federal statutes explicitly incorporate a state’s
postdeath wealth distribution system. 5 In other situations, Congress
may explicitly seek to control the wealth-transfer system, for example,
through estate and gift taxes. 6
But many federal statutes are not so finely tuned. 7 They are
generally designed to further goals that, at least initially, have little
or nothing to do with wealth transfer; they often do not even refer to
the possibility of compatible—or incompatible—state laws. Even when

4.
See James E. Pfander & Michael J.T. Downey, In Search of the Probate Exception, 67
VAND. L. REV. 1533 (2014).
5.
For example, in Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2023–24 (2012), the Supreme Court
construed the Social Security Act’s provision:
In determining whether an applicant is the child or parent of a fully or currently
insured individual for purposes of this subchapter, the Commissioner of Social
Security shall apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of
intestate personal property by the courts of the State in which such insured individual
is domiciled at the time such applicant files application, or, if such insured individual
is dead, by the courts of the State in which he was domiciled at the time of his death,
or, if such insured individual is or was not so domiciled in any State, by the courts of
the District of Columbia. Applicants who according to such law would have the same
status relative to taking intestate personal property as a child or parent shall be
deemed such.
42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2) (2012). The provision refers to “State” three times. See SUSAN GARY,
JEROME BORISON, NAOMI CAHN & PAULA MONOPOLI, CONTEMPORARY TRUSTS AND ESTATES (2d
ed. 2014).
6.
Even within that system, the Supreme Court has staked a role for state law. See supra
note 5.
7.
See Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Creeping Federalization of Wealth-Transfer Law, 67
VAND. L. REV. 1395, 1639–44 (discussing federal pension law and the Supreme Court’s opinions
in Egelhoff and Hillman). In explaining its decision, the Hillman Court noted:
One can imagine plausible reasons to favor a different policy . . . a legislature could
have thought that a default rule providing that insurance proceeds accrue to a widow
or widower, and not a named beneficiary, would be more likely to align with most
people's intentions. . . . But that is not the judgment Congress made.
Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1952 (2013).
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Congress regulates nonprobate transfers 8 and explicitly addresses
federalism issues, state trusts and estates law is not an explicit focus. 9
This Article explores the impact of federal law that is not
specifically enacted to deal with wealth transfer on the executor’s
marshaling and subsequent distribution of digital assets. (I label these
laws “nonprobate-focused federal laws.”) In doing so, this Article
focuses on the lessons from one such law: the Stored Communications
Act (“SCA”), initially enacted in 1986 as one part of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”). 10 Congress designed the SCA
to respond to concerns that Internet privacy posed new dilemmas with
respect to application of the Fourth Amendment’s privacy protections.
It regulates the relationship between the government, Internet service
providers (“ISPs”), and users in two distinct ways.
First, the statute establishes limits on the government’s ability
to require ISPs to disclose information concerning their subscribers.
An ISP may not disclose to the government any records concerning an
account holder, nor the contents of any electronic communications, in
the absence of an applicable exception, such as consent by the account
holder. 11
Second, the statute establishes limits on the providers’ ability
to disclose information voluntarily to the government or any other
person or entity. 12 Although the drafters tried to cover future
8.
See Waggoner, supra note 7, at 1651 (indicating that some nonprobate transfers are
“authorized or regulated by federal law”).
9.
One such example is the broad supersession clauses in ERISA the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) and the Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act
(“FEGLIA”). 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a); see Langbein, supra note 1, at 1671 (“[F]ederal law does not
concern itself with the recurrent constructional complications that arise in the wealth transfer
process . . . .”). FEGLIA was initially enacted in 1954, fifteen years before the Uniform Probate
Code’s revocation upon divorce provision for wills, and more than three decades before that was
extended to nonprobate transfers. See Waggoner, supra note 7, at 1640, 1643. Not surprisingly,
FEGLIA’s preemption provision addresses only state regulation of group life insurance without
any explicit reference to wills. 5 U.S.C. § 8709(d)(1).
10. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712. See generally Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored
Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208
(2004) (discussing the goals, structure, and text of the Stored Communications Act).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1) prohibits voluntary disclosure to anyone of the contents of an
electronic communication, while 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3) prevents the voluntary disclosure of
records to the government (although not to others). Depending on the nature of the data, the
government must obtain either a subpoena or a warrant, although there are some exceptions in
the case of an emergency. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b).
12. See Kerr, supra note 10, at 1212–13 (“The statute creates a set of Fourth Amendmentlike privacy protections by statute”). The 2013 revelations of Edward Snowden provide another
angle on the Stored Communications Act and providers’ willingness to disclose. The providers
didn’t want to disclose some information and the NSA either coerced them or simply took it
without their knowledge. See, e.g., Ryan Lizza, The Metadata Program in Eleven Documents,
THE NEW YORKER (Dec. 31, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2013/12/a-
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developments, at the time of the SCA’s enactment, the development of
Facebook was still almost two decades away, the founding of Google
was more than a decade in the future, and even the large-scale use of
email was still a few years distant. 13 The drafters were focused on
privacy, not on how the SCA might affect fiduciary property
management and distribution, 14 and the SCA has not been amended
since its original enactment. (Of course, few people recognized the
potentially transformative potential of the Internet on trusts and
estates practice at that point.) The resulting uncertainty affects
anyone with an email account. It hampers fiduciaries, including
personal representatives, conservators, agents acting pursuant to a
power of attorney, and trustees who want to obtain access to any type
of electronic communication, although it does not affect the ability of a
fiduciary to distribute the assets held in the underlying account—once
the fiduciary has been able to identify it.
This Article argues that, as trusts and estates law and practice
adjust to new technologies and their corresponding privacy
protections, the process requires accommodation and adjustment.
That is, while existing trusts and estates laws could legitimately be
interpreted to encompass the new technologies with no need for
revision, and while the laws applicable to these new technologies could
be interpreted to account for wealth transfer, the common law process
is typically not so seamless. 15 The result, instead, is a transition
period, with the expectation that existing legal structures will
gradually absorb the new technology.
Indeed, it is possible to interpret the SCA so that it does not
bar access by a legally recognized fiduciary to the contents of an
history-of-the-metadata-program-in-eleven-documents.html#slide_ss_0=1, archived at http://
perma.cc/8R7Y-GBAE; Ryan Lizza, State of Deception, THE NEW YORKER (Dec. 16, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/12/16/131216fa_fact_lizza, archived at http://perma.cc/
F4KK-FVXG; Laura W. Murphy, The NSA’s Winter of Discontent, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 12,
2013, 5:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/laura-w-murphy/the-nsas-winter-of-discon_b_
4434455.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3V8U-6X6W.
13. Ian Peter, The History of Email, NETHISTORY, http://www.nethistory.info/
History%20of%20the%20Internet/email.html, archived at http://perma.cc/EP9X-9JQA (last
visited Sept. 8, 2014); see William Jeremy Robison, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy
Under the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1198 (2010) (“It was on the cusp of
this phase, with computer networking in its infancy, that Congress adopted the Stored
Communications Act in 1986.”); Michael Helft & Claire Cain Miller, 1986 Privacy Law is Outrun
by the Web, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/10/technology/
10privacy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/4-2HL4.
14. There was only one reported federal case concerning the relationship between the SCA
and probate at the time of promulgation of the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act in
July 2014. In re Facebook, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 2d 1204 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
15. See, e.g., Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real Thing?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1077 (2003)
(discussing the development of adoption law).
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account holder’s communications. The existing SCA should be
interpreted as permitting fiduciaries to access otherwise-protected
content pursuant to state fiduciary law (a fiduciary stands in the
shoes of the original account holder) or through exceptions to
prohibited disclosures. Nonetheless, achieving this result is neither
automatic nor guaranteed and may require some movement in each
area of law. Instead, potential congressional amendments to the SCA,
along with supporting state legislative enactments, could clarify this
interpretation by defining “consent” by an electronic subscriber to
include disclosure of the contents of email communication. Certainty
and uniformity in this context could support fiduciaries seeking to
fulfill their obligations. Such uniformity could be mandated if federal
law were amended to include its own definitions of terms, 16 to which
states could refer to facilitate the probate process, or by uniform
statutes adopted by all states. Each of these, of course, presents its
own practical and political problems, but the underlying goals of
promoting consistency and certainty in trusts and estates law show
that federal law can play a constructive role in promoting state
policies. The lessons learned from examining the intersection of
federal law focused on digital assets and of state fiduciary law extend
more broadly to show the unintended consequences of other
nonprobate-focused federal laws. 17
In Part II, I discuss some of the complexities surrounding the
inheritance of digital assets under state law. In Part III, I turn to the
relevant federal statutes that have an impact on the transfer of digital
assets. Part IV addresses the role of federal law, arguing that the
federal statutes should be interpreted in light of relevant state law on
inheritance addressed earlier. This final section suggests reform to
existing state and federal laws to ensure that nonprobate-focused
federal laws ultimately effectuate the decedent’s intent.
II. DIGITAL ASSETS AND INHERITANCE
Trusts and estates law focuses on the disposition of various
forms of assets. 18 Over the centuries, the types of assets have changed
16. A federal definition of “child” that considered posthumous birth would have mooted
Astrue, for example. 132 S. Ct. at 2023.
17. This may suggest a parochialism—“states know best”—with respect to probate law;
while others may make that argument, I am more concerned about laws with unintended
consequences.
18. Trusts and estates law is not just for wealthy individuals, even though it is also called
“wealth transfer” law. See Naomi Cahn & Amy Ziettlow, “Making Things Fair:” An Empirical
Study of How People Actually Approach the Wealth Transmission Process (2014) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with authors). The nonprobate revolution means that almost all workers
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and expanded. In particular, new technologies pose new conundrums
for trusts and estates law. With every change in forms of wealth,
technology, or entertainment, trusts and estates law has had to adapt
correspondingly, with doctrines pressured to expand beyond real
property to stocks, bonds, copyrights—and now, digital assets. Digital
assets present the same problems as other forms of new property; they
are also problematic because federal law regulates some aspects of
their existence. Privacy concerns, the reason for the federal laws
themselves, pose a third complicating factor. 19 A fourth distinguishing
characteristic is their form of ownership, in which an account holder
enters into a terms-of-service agreement that sets out the conditions of
access.
Digital assets are not the first intangible assets that estate
planning attorneys have faced. Copyrights, for example, are assets
regulated by federal law and capable of probate and nonprobate
transfer. 20 But unlike digital assets, which are subject to terms-ofservice agreements with another party, copyrights clearly belong to
the holder. In addition, although copyrights raise piracy concerns,
they do not raise privacy issues. Like traditional letters, digital
communications raise privacy concerns for both sender and recipient.
This combination of novelty, federalism, privacy, and
ownership issues has caused some of the difficulties in handling
digital assets. Digital assets are a modern manifestation of the
changing nature of assets and, in turn, the need for trusts and estates
law to adapt. Of course, in many ways, digital assets could fit into
existing paradigms. 21 If one analogizes digital assets to tangible assets

have signed some type of beneficiary designation form. See Stewart Sterk & Melanie Leslie,
Accidental Inheritance: Retirement Accounts and the Hidden Law of Succession, 89 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 165, 169 (2014). Moreover, even people with no financial assets almost certainly have some
digital assets and may have emotional mementos of value to them or to others.
19. See generally Orin S. Kerr, Foreword: Accounting for Technological Change, 36 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 405 (2013) (contrasting predigital searches of pockets versus
smartphones).
20. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (2012) provides: “The ownership of a copyright . . . may be
bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession”;
see Devan R. Desai, The Life and Death of Copyright, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 219, 264
(“Intergenerational equity . . . may show that society’s claim is greater than an author’s lineal
descendants.”); Andrea Farkas, Comment, I’ll be Back? The Complications Heirs Face When
Terminating a Deceased Author’s Online Copyright Licenses, 5 EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J.
411, 413 (2013) (“Many heirs are unaware that they possess such a right at all . . . .”).
21. They do not, for example, present the possibility for a “revolution.” See John Langbein,
The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108,
1108–09 (1984) (discussing how probate avoidance and changes in the nature of wealth lead to a
“nonprobate revolution”); Sterk & Leslie, supra note 18, at 176–77 (“This [current] framework
generates significant advantages.”).
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or real property, then few problems should arise when the executor or
personal representative seeks to collect estate assets.
Yet the particular role of federal law as a source of regulation,
with its overarching goal protecting privacy in a world where freedom
from surveillance, 22 has assumed new meanings (note that this goal is
inherently compatible with fiduciary law, given the stringent duties of
state fiduciaries). While this Article focuses on only one aspect of the
need to coordinate state and federal law, separate state law issues
relating to ownership of digital assets may also require federal
resolution. For example, subscribers typically acquire digital assets
via a terms-of-service agreement that sets out the ownership or
licensing of those assets, and the global reach of these agreements
might appropriately be a concern of federal law.
An initial question requires determining just what constitutes a
digital asset. The Uniform Law Commission’s Uniform Fiduciary
Access to Digital Assets Act (“UFADAA”) defines a digital asset as “a
record that is electronic.” 23 As such, it includes any information that is
stored on the Internet or on a digital device (such as a computer or
smartphone), including music, photos, social media profiles, websites,
bitcoins, 24 emails, and electronic documents governing the underlying
accounts through which other property may be accessed. 25
Individuals have differing legal relationships to these assets.
For most sites, a user enters into some kind of a terms-of-service

22. See Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1905 (2013) (“Privacy
therefore is an indispensable structural feature of liberal democratic political systems.”); Daniel
Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1880, 1880 (2013) (“The goal of this bundle of rights is to provide people with control over their
personal data . . . .”).
23. UFADAA § 3(9) (2014), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/
Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital%20Assets/2014jul31_UFADAA%20as%20approved%20Jul
y%202014%20before%20styling%20and%20without%20comments.pdf,
archived
at
http://
perma.cc/YK4W-7V2N. “Electronic” and “record” are both defined in the Act.
24. BITCOIN, http://bitcoin.org/en/, archived at http://perma.cc/H5DE-WZ84 (last visited
Sept. 8, 2014). Bitcoins are a virtual currency that are not government sponsored, although an
increasing number of businesses, ranging from sports stores to travel destinations to porn sites,
accept payment in bitcoins. Id.; Shopping with Bitcoin in United States, SPENDBITCOINS,
https://www.spendbitcoins.com/places/?place_type=shopping, archived at http://perma.cc/7RNNLBWZ (last visited Sept. 8, 2014).
25. See, e.g., Gerry W. Beyer & Naomi Cahn, Digital Planning: The Future of Elder Law, 9
NAELA J. 135, 137–38 (2013) (classifying digital assets as “personal assets,” “social media
assets,” “financial accounts,” and “business accounts”); Lilian Edwards & Edina Harbinja,
Protecting Post-Mortem Privacy: Reconsidering the Privacy Interests of the Deceased in a Digital
World, 32 CARD. ARTS & ENT. L.J. 101, 104–05 (2013) (broadly defining “digital assets”); Jamie P.
Hopkins, Afterlife in the Cloud: Managing a Digital Estate, 5 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. J. 209, 211
(2013) (broadly defining “digital assets”).
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agreement, 26 clicking through a series of statements. While early
terms-of-use agreements set out terms on a separate site, they have
evolved towards a requirement that users click “I agree” before being
bound. 27 Depending on the type of agreement, a user may own,
outright, an asset that is itself capable of sale or gift during life or
upon death, or the user may simply hold a license that expires when
the account holder does. 28 For fiduciaries, the first step is learning
about and, where necessary, accessing these assets. Then, if permitted
by the terms-of-service agreement and the account holder’s intent, the
fiduciary’s second step would be to distribute these assets
appropriately. 29 Access, however, is the critical step; it provides
information about the scope of the account holder’s assets (including
both digital and nondigital assets), which then facilitates the
disposition of those assets. Emails can serve as the source for
fiduciaries to marshal both known and unknown assets, revealing the
digital equivalent of the money under the mattress or the locked box
stored underground.

26. The American Law Institute has even completed a project in this area, focusing on
what are often called “end user license agreements” (“EULAs”). PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
SOFTWARE CONTRACTS 101–44 (2010); see Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & Robert Taylor, Set in
Stone? Change and Innovation in Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 240,
241–50 (2013) (finding pro-seller EULAs have increased as well as their enforceability);
Contracts: Click Wrap Licenses, INTERNET LAW TREATISE, https://ilt.eff.org/index.php/Contracts:
Click_Wrap_Licenses, archived at http://perma.cc/VR5R-QE8R (last modified Oct. 7, 2011, 2:59
PM) (providing information on websites where a user must agree to the terms before access).
27. Michael L. Rustad & Maria Vittoria Onufrio, Reconceptualizing Consumer Terms of Use
for a Globalized Knowledge Economy, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1085, 1099–1102 (2012); see Ajemian v.
Yahoo!, 987 N.E.2d 604, 612–15 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013) (refusing to enforce choice of law coercive
TOS provisions). Thousands of customers of Gamestation, a British game site, “sold their souls”
to the site when they clicked through their sign-up agreements. Catharine Smith, 7,500 Online
Shoppers Accidentally Sold Their Souls to Gamestation, HUFFINGTON POST, (May 25, 2011, 5:10
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/04/17/gamestation-grabs-souls-o_n_541549.html,
PM),
archived at http://perma.cc/XVA5-HKLQ; Selling Your Soul, and Other Fine Print, FOX &
MATTSON, P.C. (Dec. 30, 2013), http://galaw.com/selling-your-soul-and-other-fine-print/, archived
at http://perma.cc/WR3C-WHJK.
28. See Jamie Patrick Hopkins & Ilya Alexander Lipin, Viable Solutions to the Digital
Estate Planning Dilemma, 99 IOWA L REV. BULL. 61, 65–67 (2014) (discussing difficulties
surrounding digital asset ownership); David Horton, Indescendibility, 102 CAL. L. REV. 543, 565–
67, 569–70 (2014) (discussing issues related to indescendibility by contract, when companies
limit consumers’ conveyance rights); Rustad & Onufrio, supra note 27, at 1092 (stating that
companies use EULAs to prohibit transfers and assignments of property). Professor Horton
provides examples of specific types of agreements.
29. See Horton, supra note 28 (noting the unresolved issue of indesendibility by contract in
the Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act). Distribution of assets upon death is, of course,
typically the concern of state law.
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III. DIGITAL ASSETS AND FEDERAL LAW
Like ERISA, the federal laws affecting digital assets were
enacted without consideration of state trusts and estates law. The
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, for example, is an antihacking law; 30
presumably, the type of trespass that it prevents does not include
access to digital assets and computers by a state-authorized
fiduciary. 31 The SCA, part of the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act of 1986, governs the privacy of communications and remotely
stored information on the Internet. It covers entities that provide
electronic communication services, including storage, to the public. 32
30. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). See Note, The Vagaries of Vagueness: Rethinking the CFAA as
a Problem of Private Nondelegation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 751, 751 (2013) (“The Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act of 1986 (CFAA) was enacted with the primary purpose of combating computer
hacking.”).
31. When a fiduciary accesses the decedent’s property and uses a key to enter the home
and sift through an estate as part of complying with her responsibilities to marshal estate assets,
there is a strong argument that this is comparable to use of a username and password to access
an account or an electronic device. Unlike access to the decedent’s house, however, access to a
digital account is presumably governed by a terms-of-service agreement that may prohibit thirdparty access; consequently, the fiduciary may still be violating the CFAA by exceeding access
authorized by the terms-of-service agreement. See James D. Lamm, Christina L. Kunz, Damien
A. Riehl & Peter John Rademacher, The Digital Death Conundrum: How Federal and State Laws
Prevent Fiduciaries from Managing Digital Property, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 385, 400–01 (2014)
(discussing how a terms-of-service agreement may prevent third-party access, and therefore,
while a digital asset owner may consent to fiduciary access, a TOS may expressly prohibit it); cf.
Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1078 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Individuals other than the
computer’s owner may be proximately harmed by unauthorized access, particularly if they have
rights to data stored on it.”).
32. See Suzanne B. Walsh, Coming Soon to a Legislature Near You: Comprehensive State
Law Governing Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV. 429, 433–34 (2014)
(noting restrictions on providers subject to the SCA); Suzanne Brown Walsh & Conrad Teitell,
An Eye Towards the Future: Looking Through a Google Glass Brightly—Paul’s Email to the
Corinthians, 153 TR. & EST. 32, 32–39 (2014), available at http://wealthmanagement.com/estateplanning/protecting-clients-digital-assets, archived at http://perma.cc/ZUC-5NXZ (discussing how
the SCA affects providers); Kerr, supra note 10, at 1213–14 (SCA protects information given to
two types of network providers: electronic communication service (ECS) and remote computing
service (RCS)). Commercial systems available to the public, such as Gmail or Yahoo, are covered,
while private systems, such as those used and established by an employer with access limited to
a specified group, are not covered. The term "electronic storage" covers two (potentially
overlapping) categories: “(A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic
communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and (B) any storage of such
communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of such
communication.” § 2510(17) (definitions additionally given same meaning in § 2711(1)). Courts
have held that subsection (A) covers email messages stored on the provider’s server pending
delivery to the recipient. See In re DoubleClick Privacy Litig., 154 F.Supp.2d 497, 512 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (indicating § 2510(17)(A) covers email messages); Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135
F.Supp.2d 623, 636 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (holding the Stored Communications Act does not cover posttransmission interception but covers interceptions while an email is transmitted), aff’d in part,
352 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2003). See generally UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL ch. 9-48.000
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This includes email systems. 33 Violations of the SCA provisions can
result in civil and criminal penalties. 34
The SCA addresses access alone, rather than ownership and
disposition of assets. While access is the first step in disposition, 35 the
SCA is concerned only with protecting the privacy of the account
holder rather than with ownership of the communications or of the
underlying account. It may, at least temporarily, present difficulties
for authorized fiduciaries who seek access to certain types of material
directly from an ISP.
Although the SCA applies to a wide variety of Internet
activities, portions of the law are widely recognized as outdated and in
need of adaptation to technological advances that have occurred since
it was passed. 36 Concerns over the SCA’s revision are far broader than
those relevant to trusts and estates practitioners, most generally
relating to the need to protect privacy. Despite such sweeping
concerns, the framework put in place by the SCA remains the basis
from which courts decide Internet privacy cases.
Most fundamentally, the Act regulates the disclosure of
communications and other information in the possession of ISPs. It
sets out the process that the government must follow to compel
disclosure from an ISP 37 and details the procedures for voluntary
disclosure of such information along with penalties for unauthorized
disclosures. 38 The Act applies to both providers of electronic
communication services (“ECS”) and providers of remote computing

(1997), http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/48mcrm.htm, archived
at http://perma.cc/MW5Q-329E (discussing government’s interpretation of the SCA).
33. DoubleClick, 154 F.Supp.2d at 512; Fraser, 135 F.Supp.2d at 636.
34. § 2701(b); § 2707(b); e.g., Cheng v. Romo, No. 11-10007-DJC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
28374, at *4–7 (D.C. Mass. March 6, 2014).
35. See Horton, supra note 28, at 569–70 (critiquing state laws for not addressing issues
involving the disposition of digital assets).
36. See generally Lindsay S. Feuer, Note, Who Is Poking Around Your Facebook Profile?:
The Need to Reform the Stored Communications Act to Reflect a Lack of Privacy on Social
Networking Websites, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 473, 475–76, 502–03, 511–15 (2011) (arguing the SCA
needs reform due to social media and technology); Achal Oza, Note, Amend the ECPA: Fourth
Amendment Protection Erodes as E-Mails Get Dusty, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1043, 1046, 1072–73 (2008)
(recommending changes to the ECPA to extend constitutionally owed privacy to email users);
Kerr, supra note 10, at 30–41 (explaining that while the SCA is effective, it is outdated in some
respects).
37. § 2703.
38. Id. § 2702. For a discussion of penalties, see CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R41733, PRIVACY: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ELECTRONIC PRIVACY COMMUNICATIONS ACT, 1, 45–46
(2012), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41733.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
C9JR-9NWR.
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services (“RCS”). 39 In its most basic form, as understood in 1986, this
distinction hinges on whether the service provider is providing a
communications service, rendering it an ECS provider, or a storage
service, rendering it an RCS provider. 40 An ISP can perform both
functions at once. So long as its services are available to the public, it
falls within the purview of the SCA’s privacy regulations. 41 The

39. E.g., § 2702. Note that the SCA does not apply to private email service providers. See
§ 2702(a)(2) (specifying the prohibition applies to services provided to the public); Lamm et al.,
supra note 31, at 404 (stating the SCA excludes private email providers).
40. § 2711(2) (definition of remote computing service). The differences relate to the
immediate sending as opposed to storage: an ECS enables users to send and receive wire or
electronic communications (acting more as a conduit), while an RCS provides computer storage
or processing services by means of an electronic communications system.
The problem now is that modern service providers no longer fall neatly into the
categories. However, the categorization remains important because it affects the
context in which a service provider may knowingly divulge the contents of a
communication. . . .
Essentially, a provider classified as an ECS is always prohibited from disclosing
communications in electronic storage. On the other hand, an RCS is only prohibited
from disclosing communications if the transmission was maintained solely for storage
or computer processing purposes and if the provider is not authorized to access the
contents of the communication for any purpose other than providing the services.
Meera Unnithan Sossamon, Comment, Subpoenas and Social Networks: Fixing the Stored
Communications Act in a Civil Litigation, 57 LOY. L. REV. 619, 625–26 (2011). The distinction
between the two different types of providers arose in part due to businesses outsourcing their
data processing and data storage needs. A provider can be both an ECS and RCS when it comes
to the same communication. The ISP is an ECS at the point when an email is sent and awaits
the recipient's retrieval. Once the recipient retrieves the email, the provider becomes an RCS if
the recipient keeps the email on the provider's server. For a brief history of the precise
technology regulated at the time, see Robison, supra note 13, at 1205–06 (explaining how
providers transmitted emails and how Congress responded to the new technology). Moreover, the
same entity may be an RCS or ECS as well as a non-SCA-covered entity; the legislative history
indicates that communications must be analyzed separately to determine whether they are
protected (just because an entity has some communications that may be covered, that does not
extend to all of them). H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 65 (1986), available at http://www.justice.gov/
jmd/ls/legislative_histories/pl99-508/houserept-99-647-1986.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
G28P-CPPJ; Hankins, infra note 42 (discussing public and private Facebook messages).
41. Kerr, supra note 10, at 1216–17. Two separate privacy protections are contained in 18
U.S.C. § 2702(a). They protect the contents of electronic communications: (1) that are in
electronic storage by an entity that provides an electronic communication service to the public,
18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1); and (2) that are carried or maintained by an entity that provides a remote
computing service to the public. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(2). By contrast, the content of an electronic
communication that is readily accessible to the public is not protected. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(2)(g)(i).
Court cases have reached differing conclusions on just when an email is in electronic
storage and subject to the act’s protections. E.g., Cheng v. Romo, No. 11-10007-DJC, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 179727, at *5 (D. Mass. Dec. 20, 2013) (email is in electronic storage). Compare,
e.g., Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding emails were in
electronic storage), with United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 770–73 (C.D. Ill.
2009) (finding, in the context of a criminal subpoena, that “[p]reviously opened emails stored by
Microsoft for Hotmail [email system] users are not in electronic storage”), and United States v.
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precise scope of coverage of specific ISPs is still not entirely clear,
although it appears, for example, that Facebook and other social
media sites are within the SCA’s ambit when it comes to limitedaccess (not publicly available) materials. 42
The SCA also distinguishes between “content” information,
meaning what is contained within communications generally, and
“noncontent” information, defined as “record[s] or other information
pertaining to a subscriber or customer” of the provider’s service. 43
These classifications are applicable only to the SCA’s exceptions—
those circumstances in which a provider is allowed to disclose
information in its possession. 44 An ISP may not only disclose
noncontent material to any person other than a governmental entity
(a group that would presumably include most fiduciaries) but also to
any governmental entity with the account holder’s “lawful consent.”
Noncontent information includes material about any communication
sent, such as the addressee, sender, date/time, and other subscriber

Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 291 (6th Cir. 2010) (same). Precise resolution of this issue does not,
however, affect the analysis in this Article.
42. See In re Facebook, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1205–06 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (holding
Facebook does not have to produce records of a user’s account due to SCA protection, although
not opining on whether an executor’s consent would be legally adequate to permit Facebook to
disclose); Allen D. Hankins, Note, Compelling Disclosure of Facebook Content Under the Stored
Communications Act, 17 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 295, 309–11 (2012) (private Facebook
messages are afforded protection). The SCA only protects electronic communications that, while
provided by a public server, are still restricted. See Jim Lamm, Thoughts on the Stored
Communications Act, Federal Preemption and Supremacy, and State Laws on Fiduciary Access to
Digital Property, DIGITAL PASSING (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.digitalpassing.com/author/admin/,
archived at http://perma.cc/Q2BT-A784 [hereinafter Lamm, Thoughts on the SCA]; Jim Lamm,
Facebook Blocks Demands for Access to Deceased User’s Account, DIGITAL PASSING (Oct. 11,
2012),
http://www.digitalpassing.com/2012/10/11/facebook-blocks-demand-contents-deceasedusers-account/, archived at http://perma.cc/84QU-2D9B [hereinafter Lamm, Facebook Blocks
Demands]. Thus, content available to anyone through your Facebook account is not covered, but
content that only your “friends” can see is apparently covered. See Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean
Hosp. Serv. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 659, 665–66 (D.N.J. 2013) (holding nonpublic Facebook posts
are covered by SCA); Catherine Crane, Social Networking v. the Employment-at-Will Doctrine: A
Potential Defense for Employees Fired for Facebooking, Terminated for Twittering, Booted for
Blogging, and Sacked for Social Networking, 89 WASH. U.L. REV. 639, 668 (2012) (SCA protects
private Facebook messages).
43. See § 2702(b), (c); § 2510(8); H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 34; Kerr, supra note 10, at 1228
(noncontent information includes “logs of account usage, mail header information minus the
subject line, lists of outgoing e-mail addresses sent from an account and basic subscriber
information all count as noncontent information”); Matthew J. Tokson, The Content/Envelope
Distinction in Internet Law, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2121–23 (2009) (noting the SCA
allows certain disclosures of noncontent information). At the time of the SCA’s enactment, pen
registers, which record the phone numbers called from a particular telephone line, were held not
to be content. H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 34.
44. For records, as opposed to content, the ISP can voluntarily disclose with the customer’s
lawful consent as well as to any entity other than the government. § 2702(c).

7 – Cahn FINAL LOOK (Do Not Delete)

1710

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

11/18/2014 3:22 PM

[Vol. 67:6:1697

data. 45 For content-based communications, by contrast, voluntary
disclosure is only permitted for seven reasons. Most significantly, an
ISP may divulge content information “with the lawful consent of the
originator or an addressee or intended recipient of such
communication, or the subscriber in the case of a remote computing
service.” 46 Interpreting this lawful consent exception is at the core of
the problem for fiduciaries.
Beyond the issue of lawful consent, additional legal rationales
support fiduciary access to SCA-protected information. For example, if
a fiduciary takes on the legal status of the account holder, then the
fiduciary’s own lawful consent is itself enough to satisfy the SCA, and
any possible provider liability pursuant to the SCA becomes
irrelevant. In addition, it is worth pondering whether the SCA, as
written, creates privacy protections that survive death, although it
does apply when the account holder is incapacitated. 47
A. Lawful Consent by Whom?
The SCA’s limitations on disclosure of information have
significant implications for estate administration 48 even though—or
perhaps because—the provision does not explicitly address whether a
fiduciary has lawful consent to access a decedent’s digital assets.
While the authors of the SCA in the mid-1980s understood that
technology would continue to evolve and develop, they surely never
contemplated such dynamic changes in electronic communications and
storage, as Congress defined them at the time. As such, the
unauthorized access that Congress feared—from a potentially
unknown third party with the intent to do harm to the subscriber or
communicator or to benefit from the subscriber’s information—is
fundamentally different from the access at issue when a courtappointed fiduciary (or one authorized by the original account holder)
is seeking access.

45. § 2703.
46. § 2702(b). It may be, as one state court found, that “court-ordered consent would be
effective to satisfy the Act.” Negro v. Superior Court, No. H040146, 2014 WL 5341926, at *11
(Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2014).
47. See generally Horton, supra note 28, at 559–61 (discussing survivability of defamation
and publicity rights lawsuits); 569–70 (noting that it is arguable the SCA “forbid[s] personal
representatives from taking control of a decedent’s email . . . a result that would make all
information therein indescendible”).
48. See Kristina Sherry, What Happens to Our Facebook Accounts When We Die?: Probate
vs. Policy and the Fate of Social Media Assets Post-Mortem, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 185, 193–04 (2012)
(defining and discussing classes of “digital assets”).
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The stated and applied purposes of the SCA, its drafters’
emphasis on the validity of implied consent as a means of lawful
consent, and the traditionally understood role of an executor or
administrator should most strongly inform an analysis of the intended
meaning of the lawful consent exception. All three factors support the
view that, in the absence of testamentary language to the contrary, a
decedent gives lawful consent to the personal representative of her
estate to access not only her tangible assets but also her digital ones.
Of course, when a testamentary instrument includes explicit consent,
then a fiduciary’s access should pose no problem under the SCA.
B. The Purposes of the SCA
“When the Framers of the Constitution acted to guard against
the arbitrary use of government power to maintain surveillance over
citizens, there were limited methods of intrusion into the ‘houses,
papers and effects’ protected by the Fourth Amendment,” the House
Committee Report on the SCA reads. “During the intervening 200
years, development of new methods of communication and devices for
surveillance has expanded dramatically the opportunity for such
intrusions.” 49
The evil that Congress intended to guard against in enacting
the SCA was clear. In extending Fourth Amendment–type protections
to digital communications and information, the SCA would perform a
balancing function: by “protecting privacy interests in personal
information stored in computerized systems, while also protecting the
Government’s legitimate law enforcement needs, the Privacy Act
[would create] a zone of privacy to protect Internet subscribers from
having their personal information wrongfully used and publicly
disclosed by ‘unauthorized private parties.’ ” 50 In practice, the Act
functions with the twin aims of limiting the government’s power to
compel ISPs to provide information and limiting the circumstances
under which such providers can voluntarily disclose information to
other third parties. 51

49. H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 16 (1986).
50. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557, 1986 WL
31929 (emphasis added). In introducing the bill, Senator Leahy explained, “There may have been
a day when good locks on the door and physical control of your own papers guaranteed a certain
degree of privacy. But the new information technologies have changed all that.” 131 CONG. REC.
24, 366 (1985), (statement of Sen. Leahy), available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/ls/
legislative_histories/pl99-508/cr-24365-71-1985.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/424U-2G23. As
discussed infra, the role of a fiduciary frequently involves access to just such papers.
51. Kerr, supra note 10, at 1212–13.
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The theme of Fourth Amendment–like trespass is consistent
throughout the SCA’s legislative history, and subsequent courts have
used this analogy to define the scope of the Act. 52 In its SCA report,
the Senate Committee gave insight into the types of privacy violations
within Congress’s contemplation at the time of the law’s passage. With
respect to RCS data, the Committee was primarily concerned with the
vulnerable state of personal information, such as medical and
business records, stored in offsite data banks. “For the person or
business whose records are involved,” the Senate report states,
the privacy or proprietary interest in [the stored] information should not change.
Nevertheless, because it is subject to control by a third-party computer operator, the
information may be subject to no constitutional privacy protection . . . Thus, the
information may be open to possible wrongful use and public disclosure by law
enforcement authorities as well as unauthorized private parties. The provider of these
services can do little under current law to resist unauthorized access to [it]. 53

This example suggests the Committee’s focus was on several general
types of unauthorized access by “unauthorized” individuals and the
government. Possible misuses included potential harm to a subscriber
(e.g., disclosing information about his medical condition) and
procuring a benefit for the unauthorized actor (e.g., gaining a business
advantage by accessing the subscriber’s financial records).
As mentioned earlier, the SCA distinguishes between two types
of materials subject to federal protection. Because ISPs can
voluntarily disclose noncontent material, this presents fewer problems
for fiduciaries. It is the content-based material, the letter itself rather
than the envelope, which may have the most useful information to
fiduciaries and which is subject to more stringent protection. Under
the SCA, the relevant issue is who is seeking disclosure. If an
“addressee or intended recipient . . . or an agent of such addressee or
intended recipient” is seeking disclosure, then the ISP can disclose the
content to that individual. 54 When a third party is seeking disclosure,
an ISP may only disclose content-based material under certain limited
circumstances, including—most critically for fiduciaries—with the
lawful consent of the originator, the addressee, or the intended
recipient. 55

52. See Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1072–73 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Permission to
access a stored communication does not constitute valid authorization if it would not defeat a
trespass claim in analogous circumstances.”). See generally Cornerstone Consultants, Inc. v.
Prod. Input Solutions, L.L.C., 789 F.Supp.2d 1029, 1042 (N.D. Iowa 2011) (noting some courts
have used common-law trespass claims as an analogy).
53. S.REP. NO. 99-541, at 3.
54. § 2702(b)(1).
55. § 2702(b)(3).
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With this background in mind, it is not surprising that the Act
treats potential hackers as “computer trespassers.” 56 Some courts
have explicitly adopted this language in their analyses of potential
SCA violations, analogizing the unauthorized access of electronic
communications or subscriber information to the tort of trespass. 57
Thus, a husband’s unauthorized reading of his wife’s email messages
could violate the SCA. 58
On the other hand, in enacting the SCA, Congress sought to
protect privacy against unwarranted government snooping, rather
than against the garden variety marshaling of assets engaged in by
executors and other fiduciaries. 59 Nonetheless, this concept of lawful
consent does create a potential obstacle to providing SCA-protected
information to an individual empowered by law not only to access the
assets of, but also to administer the estate of, the account holder. 60
However, the purposes of the SCA, as stated and in practice, belie the
argument that a fiduciary commits the type of trespass that the SCA
seeks to prevent.

56. See § 2510(21) (defining a computer trespasser as someone who “accesses a protected
computer without authorization. . . . [This] does not include a person known by the owner or
operator of the protected computer to have an existing contractual relationship with the owner or
operator [to access it.]”).
57. See, e.g., Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1073 (analyzing the statute with basic trespass principles
in mind); Van Alstyne v. Elec. Scriptorium, Ltd., 560 F.3d 199, 208 n.4 (4th Cir. 2009)
(acknowledging a court’s use of trespass as an analogy but declining to use it in this case as the
court found it unnecessary to resolve the question).
58. Bailey v. Bailey, No. 07-11672, 2008 WL 324156, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 6, 2008)
(rejecting husband's claim for summary judgment that he did not violate the SCA when he read
wife's emails).
59. Some decedents would prefer that their intimate correspondence never be disclosed to
anyone—even their executor. Such an issue is not, of course, unique to the digital world. See, e.g.,
Daniel B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justifications, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1175 (2013) (exploring economic costs of restricting the right to destroy
property post death); John H. Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt? Trust Law’s Limits on the Settlor’s
Power to Direct Investments, 90 B.U. L. REV. 375, 378 (2010) (discussing the rule against
capricious purposes); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 852–54
(2005) (critiquing and explaining restrictions on trust law preventing some destruction of the
testator’s property); see also Mary Sarah Bilder, The Shrinking Back: The Law of Biography, 43
STAN. L. REV. 299, 330 (1991) (reporting on requests by famous authors, including Beckett and
Kafka, to destroy their works).
60. This need not create an obstacle; indeed, as the federal court in the Facebook litigation
noted, nothing precluded Facebook from deciding to release the material on its own (the court
held it had no power to compel Facebook to do so). In re Facebook, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 2d 1204,
1205 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
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C. Explicit and Implicit Consent
The SCA’s limitations on disclosure of information have
significant implications for the administration of digital assets 61 even
though—or perhaps because—the Act does not explicitly address
whether a fiduciary has such lawful consent to legally access a
decedent’s digital assets.
In its short discussion of the lawful consent exception, the SCA
House Committee Report emphasized that such consent need not be
explicit. It listed various types of acceptable implied consent,
consistent with the need to protect against “digital trespassing” and
public disclosure of the protected information. These acceptable forms
include “a grant of consent electronically”; consent “inferred . . . from a
course of dealing between the service provider and the customer or
subscriber”; “a user having had a reasonable basis for knowing that
disclosure or use may be made with respect to a communication, and
having taken action that evidences acquiescence to such disclosure or
use”; “the very nature of the electronic transaction” (i.e., one that is
inherently public); and the terms and conditions of the provider’s
site. 62
While this list does not appear to be exhaustive, it does serve
as an indicator of the types of implied consent that Congress
contemplated at the time of the SCA’s passage. All of these examples
complement the legislative purposes of the Act. If one uses legislative
history to interpret the meaning of lawful consent, 63 then there seems
to be no question that state-recognized fiduciaries should be included
within the lawful consent exception.
Not surprisingly, litigation dealing with the issue of “lawful
consent” for information from an RCS has often concerned ISPs’
disclosure of an account holder's browsing behavior and comparable
identifying information to third-party advertisers. 64 In analyzing
61. See Kristina Sherry, supra note 48 (defining and discussing classes of “digital assets”).
62. H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 66 (1986), available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/ls/
legislative_histories/pl99-508/houserept-99-647-1986.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/G28PCPPJ.
63. There is, of course, a massive literature on the persuasive value of legislative history in
interpreting statutes. E.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 221–30 (2d ed. 2006); John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91
VA. L. REV. 419, 419 (2005); Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The
Administrative State, the Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative History, 1890-1950, 123 YALE L.J.
266, 315–65 (2013).
64. See generally 4 IAN BALLON, E-COMMERCE & INTERNET LAW: TREATISE WITH FORMS
§ 50.06[4][C][iii] (2d ed. & Supp. 2012–2013) (discussing litigation surrounding implied consent
and disclosure of information to third parties).
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whether valid lawful consent was given in these cases, courts have
examined ISPs’ terms-of-use and privacy policies, and consumer
conduct indicating possible acquiescence to disclosure. 65 These
situations are prime examples of one type of “trespassing” and
“disclosure” that the SCA intended to prevent in the absence of
authorization. By exchanging information about subscribers and their
online preferences, ISPs and third-party advertising agencies benefit
financially, possibly at the expense of account holders. While Congress
did not expressly envision this type of monetary benefit in the mid1980s, examples of contemplated implied consent given in the SCA’s
legislative history provide ample guidance for courts to interpret and
rule on such situations, even with the comparatively advanced state of
technology today.
By contrast, in the executor’s quest to access a decedent’s
digital assets, there is no obvious direct reference in the SCA’s
legislative history concerning implied consent. At the time that the
SCA was passed, legislatures feared disclosure risks concerning
government searches and seizures, as well as the unknown entities
who stood to benefit from accessing digital assets. Thus, the provisions
were relevant to trespass generally and to ad agencies specifically.
The SCA does not address this information as a personal asset—that
is, as an intrinsically valuable possession that would provide useful
information to a fiduciary.
While the SCA’s creators did foresee the evolution of thencurrent technology to more sophisticated systems, they remained
concerned with protecting people’s online security from unauthorized,
unknown entities desiring to harm them by publicizing or exploiting
their information. Lawmakers did not view these advances as we see
them today—as a set of assets capable of inheritance or facilitating
access to other assets—and thus did not link the provision of lawful
consent to the role of an estate executor or administrator. This silence
and the differences between lawmakers’ stated fears and estate
administration scenarios provide some evidence that Congress did not
intend the SCA to preclude a decedent from passing on access to
digital assets along with the physical assets composing his estate.
Furthermore, the SCA’s emphasis on implied consent suggests
that the circumstances of such consent should be evaluated when
deciding who has been given access to a subscriber’s digital
information. Consequently, the fiduciary’s traditional role supports
permitting access to a decedent’s information, since a fiduciary must
faithfully represent the interests of the decedent.
65.

Id.
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Executors and administrators have lawful authority to
administer the estate of the decedent, providing for the distribution
and care of assets. They are often related to the decedent and, unlike
anonymous hackers, are chosen by either the testator or the courts.
This selection endows them with the responsibility of either carrying
out the decedent’s will or following those procedures established by
law to administer the estate. An executor or administrator is hardly
the sort of trespasser envisioned by the SCA, someone who accesses a
decedent’s information without authorization, intending to benefit
from such information or to do harm to the decedent. While there is
always the potential that even an executor or administrator could
misappropriate SCA-protected information, this risk is present in the
administration of tangible assets as well as digital ones, and state
fiduciary law is designed to guard against just such misuse.
The fiduciary obligations of personal representatives to
administer an estate in the best interests of the beneficiaries, of
conservators to administer the protected person’s property in
accordance with her interests, of trustees to act with loyalty to the
beneficiaries of a trust, and of agents to act with loyalty to a
principal 66 are frustrated by the denial of their access to digital assets.
The responsibilities of these fiduciaries underscore the importance of
acknowledging that they have the lawful consent of the decedent,
protected person, settlor, or principal to access digital assets. For
example, personal representatives need to administer the estate as
quickly and effectively as possible, to prevent the potential identity
theft that may occur if the decedent’s accounts are left to languish, to
prevent losses to the estate, and to preserve the decedent’s story to the
extent possible. 67 The drafters of the SCA surely did not intend for
their limits on disclosure of digital information to frustrate this
process in the electronic world. Their aim was to provide Fourth
Amendment-style protection against invasions of privacy, a very
different issue from the concerns involved when appointing a
fiduciary. Indeed, some invasion of privacy is inherent in the process
of administering any estate or acting on behalf of a protected person;
the goal of such invasion is, however, to act in the individual’s best
interests.
Consequently, the SCA’s stated and applied purposes, its
emphasis on implied consent to disclosure of a communicator’s or
subscriber’s digital information, and the traditional role of an estate
66. See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-703 (2010); UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 801–04 (2010).
67. Beyer & Cahn, supra note 25, at 137–41. Each of the other fiduciaries has comparable
responsibilities.
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executor or administrator can support a court holding that upon
death, a decedent’s digital assets pass along with his tangible ones, to
be handled by an estate administrator. That is, even without any
amendment to existing law or passage of new laws, a court could
reasonably interpret the SCA to permit a fiduciary to access digital
assets. Moreover, to the extent the fiduciary steps into the shoes of the
account holder, there is an argument that the lawful consent
requirement is irrelevant.
D. So What About Fiduciaries—In Actions?
Federal courts have paid little attention to the intersection
between the SCA and trusts and estates fiduciaries. The earliest—and
so far the only—recorded case concerned the estate of model Sahar
Daftary. Daftary, at one time a personal shopper and a Face of Asia
model, died after she fell from the twelfth floor of the apartment
building in which her former boyfriend lived. 68 The executors of her
estate sought access to the contents of her Facebook account as part of
a coroner’s inquest to determine whether her death was a suicide.
Facebook objected to a subpoena, noting that it could not be compelled
to disclose pursuant to a voluntary subpoena. In its filing, Facebook
requested the federal court to issue an order specifying that the estate
executors could provide lawful consent under the SCA. Facebook
pointed out that the SCA itself does not clearly authorize personal
representatives to provide the requisite consent and that Facebook
could be subject to penalties for a release in violation of the statute. 69
The court agreed that Daftary’s executors could not obtain the
material through a subpoena, but it then ducked the issue of whether
the executors could provide lawful consent for Facebook to release the
material voluntarily. The court stated that it:
lacks jurisdiction to address whether the Applicants may offer consent on Sahar’s behalf
so that Facebook may disclose the records voluntarily. . . . Of course, nothing prevents
Facebook from concluding on its own that Applicants have standing to consent on
Sahar’s behalf and providing the requested materials voluntarily. 70

68. Nazia Parveen, Beauty Queen Who Died After Plunging 150 Ft Discovered Two Escorts
at Her Ex-lover’s Apartment an Hour Before Her Death, MAIL ONLINE (July 24, 2012, 3:02 PM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2178451/Sahar-Daftary-death-Beauty-queen-diedfalling150ft-discovered-escorts-exs-apartment-hour-death.html; Sahar Daftary Inquest: Model’s
Ultimatum to ‘Husband,’ BBC NEWS (July 25, 2012, 1:07 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ukengland-manchester-18988374, archived at http://perma.cc/PG2N-QDPM.
69. Facebook Inc.’s Motion to Quash Subpoena in a Civil Case at 6–7, In re Facebook, Inc.,
923 F. Supp. 2d 1204 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (No. 5:12-mc-80171-LHK (PSG)), 2012 WL 8505651.
70. Facebook, 923 F. Supp. 2d at 1206.
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By refusing to resolve the ambiguity surrounding lawful
consent, the court left Facebook and the executors—and others looking
for precedent—in legal limbo. ISPs have, in other circumstances,
disclosed protected material pursuant to a civil court order, although
in the absence of a court’s explicit finding of lawful consent or that the
executor is an agent, such disclosure appears to place ISPs at risk of
violating the SCA. 71
E. But Is Federal Law Really a Problem?
Violations of the SCA subject various entities to both civil and
criminal liability, permitting an “aggrieved individual” 72 to sue for
declaratory relief, injunctive relief, damages, and reasonable
attorneys’ fees. SCA cases so far have typically involved interception
of electronic communications by an allegedly unauthorized third
party. Of course, access to communications by a fiduciary presents a
different situation. It is possible, however, that email recipients or
civil liberties groups may claim aggrieved status under the SCA. In
these situations, the fiduciary faces potential liability.
IV. CHANGES
The increasing relevance of federal law to state probate laws is
a cause for examination and, in some cases, concern. 73 When it affects

71. Stefanie Olsen, Yahoo Releases E-mail of Deceased Marine, ZD NET, (April 21, 2005,
7:39
PM),
http://www.zdnet.com/news/yahoo-releases-e-mail-of-deceased-marine/142440,
archived at http://perma.cc/ZL6P-U4T8. Yahoo may only, however, have released the emails
Ellsworth received. Jennifer Chambers, Family Gets GI’s E-Mail, THE DETROIT NEWS, (April 28,
2005, 8:01 PM), http://www.justinellsworth.net/email/detnewsapr.htm, archived at http://
perma.cc/GUQ8-T9RV. Such an outcome fits within the SCA exception of releasing content to an
addressee but does not address the question of whether the family members could provide lawful
consent. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1), (3) (2012).
72. § 2510(11) (defining “aggrieved person” under ECPA as one “who was a party to any
intercepted wire, oral, or electronic communication or against whom an interception was
directed”); § 2520(a) ( “[A]ny person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted,
disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of this chapter may in a civil action recover from the
person or entity, other than the United States, which engaged in that violation such relief as
may be appropriate.”); § 2707(a):
Except as provided in section 2703(e), any provider of electronic communication
service, subscriber, or other person aggrieved by any violation of this chapter in which
the conduct constituting the violation is engaged in with a knowing or intentional
state of mind may, in a civil action, recover from the person or entity, other than the
United States, which engaged in that violation such relief as may be appropriate.
73. See, e.g., John H. Langbein & Lawrence Waggoner, American College of Trust and
Estate Counsel Joseph Trachtman Memorial Lecture (March 2012), in 38 ACTEC L.J. 1 (2012).
Two decades ago, I explored how the Domestic Relations Exception may actually show a lack of
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state inheritance law, federal law can either work in tandem with
state law or hamper state law. In some instances, federal law can—
and should—play a productive role in state trusts and estates law. At
the least, in areas where state actions do not threaten federal policies,
the federal government should leave space for states to continue in
their traditional roles in this area. “Stale” 74 federal laws do (at least
arguably 75) affect fiduciaries in probate law. Existing laws—the SCA,
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and state fiduciary laws—could
be interpreted to permit fiduciary access without any further action.
Nonetheless, taking actions to update federal law, or to develop
uniformity among the states, could ensure certainty and
predictability.
A. Amending Federal Law
The most straightforward approach to clarifying any
ambiguities surrounding fiduciary access would be adding explicit
authorization for such access directly into federal law. The SCA’s
exceptions allowing an ISP to voluntarily disclose could be amended to
allow for disclosure to the agent of a communication’s originator or for
an agent to give lawful consent to disclosure. 76 The legislative fix
would be simple: add “or state-recognized fiduciary” to the list of those
who can provide lawful consent for disclosure. Of course, this
amendment would still not compel ISPs to disclose, but presumably
they would, in good faith, comply with a fiduciary’s request.
On the other hand, the simplest solution of amending the SCA
is difficult politically. Legislators and commentators have repeatedly
advocated reforms to the SCA, advancing a variety of different bases
and multiple reasons, with no resulting change. 77 As in many areas of
respect for its subject. Naomi Cahn, Family Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 79 IOWA L.
REV. 1073, 1111–15 (1994).
74. See Adam J. Hirsch, Text and Time: A Theory of Testamentary Obsolescence, 86 WASH
U. L. REV. 609, 611–13 (2009) (discussing the issue of a “stale will,” when courts have to decide to
interpret the text “statically or dynamically”).
75. As noted earlier, if the fiduciary is presumed to take on the legal status of the account
holder, which is the assumption under state laws, then the fiduciary’s consent is sufficient to
allow for release of content-based information. Fiduciaries assume their authority under state
law, and in the absence of the presumption that they have the same powers as the original
account holder, federal law could be used to prevent their access.
76. § 2702(b)(1), (3); see Lamm et al., supra note 31, at 413–14 (proposing similar solution
and including draft language). The authors are more skeptical than I am about the viability of “a
clear and comprehensive solution at common law.” Id. at 412.
77. See, e.g., Patrick Leahy, Leahy, Lee Introduce Legislation To Update Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, PATRICK LEAHY, (March 19, 2013), http://www.leahy.senate.gov/
press/leahy-lee-introduce-legislatio-to-update-electronic-communications-privacy-act, archived at
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law, it can be difficult to prompt Congress to take action, and the SCA
deals with sensitive issues of privacy and national security.
In the absence of such explicit authorization, state and federal
courts might simply interpret the statute to permit fiduciary access.
The Daftary court order left open this possibility and arguably even
suggested that Facebook might reasonably conclude that Daftary’s
executors could provide lawful consent. More formally, courts could
develop a federal common law that recognizes fiduciary control. 78 The
factors that support development of federal common law—“unique
federal interests at stake, a need for uniformity, and the impropriety
of relying on state law” 79—are present here. Moreover, common-law
recognition of fiduciary control would facilitate the implementation of
the SCA and the ECPA, 80 forestalling the potential for an increasing
number of conflicts as fiduciaries manage digital assets. On the other
hand, the power of federal courts to make federal common law in this
area is subject to debate. 81
B. Uniformity Among the States
While the question of whether lawful consent includes statedesignated fiduciaries requires interpreting federal law, states can
play several different roles. First, in the absence of federal legislation,
states can enact laws that define lawful consent in the hope that
federal courts will defer to their definition. Second, they can develop
laws defining the scope of access, clarifying whether digital assets
http://perma.cc/WZN9-7VWQ (advocating for an update to the ECPA); Matt Sledge, ECPA
Amendment Passes, As Senate Judiciary Votes To Require Warrant For Email Snooping,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 29, 2012, 1:10 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/29/ecpaelectronic-communications-privacy-act_n_2211889.html, archived at http://perma.cc/DD83-VR2W
(reporting the Senate Judiciary Committee’s vote to amend part of the ECPA); Kerr, supra note
10, at 32–36 (explaining why and how the ECPA should be amended); Oza, supra note 36, at
1068–71 (suggesting amendments to the ECPA).
78. As John Langbein notes, this solution still does not ensure uniformity: “unless and
until the Supreme Court (or Congress) does the federalizing, disagreements can form among the
federal courts.” Langbein, supra note 1, at 1692.
79. Gillian Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1293, 1297 (2012).
80. See Mark D. Rosen, Contextualizing Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 781, 804–05 (2008)
(“[T]he judicial role in preemption matters can be understood as falling within the power of the
federal courts to create federal common law that helps implement federal statutes.”).
81. See Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal Common Law, 153 U.
PA. L. REV. 825, 826–27 (2005):
Legal scholars have propounded several theories that attempt to justify the existence
and scope of federal common law [with some arguing (1) that] federal courts have
inherent power to make federal common law in certain circumstances; and (2) [others
arguing] that federal courts have power to make federal common law only if Congress
has delegated power to them to do so.
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should—or should not—be treated in the same manner as other assets
handled by fiduciaries. 82
Indeed, a growing number of states are considering, or have
already enacted, legislation seeking to authorize personal
representatives to access digital assets. Existing state legislation
provides differing levels of access for fiduciaries over differing types of
digital assets. 83 Many state laws have not addressed federal
communications privacy law. 84
The Uniform Law Commission’s Uniform Fiduciary Access to
Digital Assets (“UFADA”) Drafting Committee developed a model
state law that vests fiduciaries with the authority to access, manage,
copy, or delete digital assets and accounts. 85 Unlike existing state
laws, the model law goes beyond personal representatives to cover
other fiduciaries as well: trustees, agents acting pursuant to a power
of attorney, and conservators. The Committee’s goal was to support
digital access by those whom the original account holder or a court
had legally authorized to act on the account holder’s behalf. Like
existing state laws in this area, the model law does not address

82. Many ISPs are concerned about privacy issues raised by fiduciary access to digital
assets. See, e.g., Letter from Carl Szabo, Policy Counsel, NetChoice, to Rep. Peter C.
Schwartzkopf, Speaker, Del. House of Representatives (June 12, 2014), http://netchoice.org/wpcontent/uploads/NetChoice-Opposition-to-DE-HB-345-House-of-Representatives.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/WNB4-3WBE (opposing fiduciary access because it “allows fiduciaries to read
private and/or confidential communications such as spousal communications or a deceased
doctor’s communications with their patients”).
83. See Chelsea Ray, Note, ‘Til Death Do Us Part: A Proposal for Handling Digital Assets
After Death, 47 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 583, 601–04 (2013) (examining existing state law
regarding digital assets); Maeve Duggan, Proposed Law Would Clarify Who Gets Access to a
Deceased Person’s Digital Accounts, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, (May 6, 2014),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/05/06/proposed-law-would-clarify-who-gets-access-toa-deceased-persons-digital-accounts/, archived at http://perma.cc/WU54-VL7R (including a table
depicting various states’ digital assets laws); Beyer & Cahn, supra note 25, at 142–45
(identifying three generations of state laws based on coverage and access).
84. Moreover, state laws in this area are concerned with fiduciary access rather than asset
distribution and allow existing terms-of-service agreements to control ownership issues. Pending
Massachusetts legislation would allow for state law on access to trump contrary terms-of-service
agreements. H.B. 4243, 188th Gen. Court (Mass. 2014); see also Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 987
N.E.2d 604, 614 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013) (fiduciary ability to challenge terms-of-service agreement).
Access is a federal law issue to the extent it concerns electronic communications subject to the
SCA. Otherwise, because there are few other relevant federal laws, distribution of assets is
almost always subject to state probate and nonprobate law. See Horton, supra note 28, at 570
(gently critiquing UFADAA: “what is likely to be the most comprehensive revision to this area
would not prevent firms from eliminating descendibility through the simple expedient of text on
a page”).
85. UFADAA (2014). The Committee has observers from the trusts and estates bar and the
elder law bar, as well as representatives from various types of Internet service and content
providers.
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distribution of digital assets, on the assumption that it supplements
existing state law in this area.
UFADA sets out two different categories of digital assets: those
subject to the SCA and all others. 86 The uniform act seeks to provide
fiduciaries with access to digital accounts and assets not covered by
federal law in the same manner as fiduciaries may access other types
of property historically subject to their authority.
For electronic communications addressed in federal law,
UFADA adopts a similar distinction to that already in the SCA; it
distinguishes between noncontent material—that is, subscriber
information that ISPs can voluntarily release without lawful consent
to any entity other than the government—and content-based
communication. A fiduciary can only access the content-based
communication with specific authority to do so. For personal
representatives, this means a will or, where the will is silent or the
decedent died intestate, a court order; for conservators, a court order;
and for trustees and agents, the underlying trust document or power
of attorney. Where the account holder has affirmatively indicated that
it does not wish a fiduciary to access these materials, the fiduciary is
without authority to do so. 87
UFADA seeks to place the fiduciary into the shoes of the
account holder through a variety of provisions: (1) it specifies that the
fiduciary should be deemed to have the account holder’s lawful
consent, to establish that releasing the contents of electronic
communications complies with the SCA; (2) it clarifies that if any
digital material was illegally obtained by the decedent, then the
fiduciary’s attempt to take control of it will not “launder” it to pass
clean title to the heirs; and (3) it sidesteps contentious issues about
whether a fiduciary can challenge restrictive terms of service
precluding transfer or specifying choice of law. 88 The Act does include
86. Id. §§ 4–7.
87. Id. § 7(b).
88. In general, a fiduciary can assert whatever rights could be asserted by the account
holder, subject to recognition of the indescendibility of certain types of claims. See, e.g., Ajemian,
987 N.E.2d at 614 (allowing coadministrators of the decedent’s estate to challenge a forum
selection clause in a TOS agreement); Horton, supra note 28, at 570 (“The [UFADAA] would give
personal representatives nearly the same dominion over virtual assets that they enjoy over
chattels and real estate.”). One concern at drafting committee meetings was fiduciaries’ efforts to
access and then possibly transfer illegally obtained property, such as pirated material. There are
potentially interesting analogies to digital property in the gun area (that the author is just
beginning to explore). See also Lee-Ford Tritt, Dispatches from the Trenches of America’s Great
Gun Trust Wars, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 154, 175 (2013) (discussing the utility of gun trusts in the
federal law context of firearm regulation); Nathan G. Rawling, Note, A Testamentary Gift of
Felony: Avoiding Criminal Penalties from Estate Firearms, 23 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 286, 287–
90 (2010) (noting the interplay of federal and state law in firearm ownership).
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one right for the fiduciary that goes beyond the rights of the account
holder: if the SCA permits the ISP to disclose, then the UFADA
requires the ISP to do so in order to ensure fiduciary access and ease
of administration, so that the fiduciary has the same knowledge base
as the account holder. 89
In the absence of specific federal law authorizing or precluding
fiduciary access, and without more specific definitions of lawful
consent from either Congress or federal courts, this becomes a
federalism issue: What happens when a state enacts legislation in a
field potentially governed by a federal statute? 90 Can state law
establish who satisfies the lawful consent requirement of federal law
and then mandate that content providers disclose material? Under the
Supremacy Clause, of course, state laws cannot override federal laws.
However, even though states cannot require federal courts to interpret
federal statutes in a specific way, federal courts may look to state law
for help in interpretation in certain contexts. Consent is a standard
state law issue present, for example, in tort and contract cases. On the
other hand, lawful consent may have a specific meaning within the
SCA. Existing state laws and the UFADA expressly allow fiduciary
access and define lawful consent, causing a potential conflict with
federal law.
Under basic principles of federalism, state law may be
explicitly preempted when Congress entirely and explicitly displaces
state legislation. 91 That is, a statute may specifically delineate its
preemptive consequences. 92 While the SCA is not explicitly
preemptive, state law can also be preempted without such a direct
statement. Implied preemption comes in two flavors: field preemption
89. UNIF. LAW. COMM’N, FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT § 9 (2014). This has
been a particularly contentious provision.
90. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 867 (2000). See RICHARD H. FALLON, ET
AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 644 (6th ed. 2009)
(noting that “a federal statutory term [may sometimes be] interpreted as embodying a state law
definition”). See generally Richard Epstein, Federal Preemption, and Federal Common Law, in
Nuisance Cases, 102 NW. U.L. REV. 551, 553 (2008) (“On matters of federal-state regulation, the
basic presumption is one against preemption, subject to some key exceptions.”). For general
commentary on federalism, preemption, Erie, and related issues, see CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR MILLER, 19 FED. PRAC. & PROC. §§ 4514–20 (2d ed. 1996 & Supp. 2014)
91. See Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against
Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 270 (2012) (noting “some statutes have
express preemption provisions”). Even the Egelhoff court noted, “There is indeed a presumption
against pre-emption in areas of traditional state regulation such as family law,” although it
continued: “But that presumption can be overcome where, as here, Congress has made clear its
desire for pre-emption.” Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 151 (2001).
92. Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalism, 53 UCLA L. REV.
1353, 1366 n.40 (2006).
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and conflict preemption. 93 Field preemption occurs when the “statute
is written in such a way that it provides no room for the operation of
state law on the subject,” while “[c]onflict preemption is a narrower
doctrine, recognizing state law to be preempted when it directly
conflicts with existing federal law, or when state regulations interfere
with or frustrate the implementation of congressional objectives.” 94 Of
course, these categories are complex and overlap more in practice than
jurisprudential, categorical descriptions may suggest. 95
Preemption must be affirmatively shown. Indeed, as Professor
Daniel Meltzer notes, “a number of canons of construction instruct
courts to interpret federal statutes in a fashion designed to minimize
conflict with state policy and state law.” 96 That is, the presumption
against preemption requires a showing of congressional intent to
supersede state law. 97 Courts must decide whether “a statute is
sufficiently clear to trigger preemption and when it is so ambiguous as
to leave state law undisturbed.” 98
Particularly if federal law affects a field historically subject to
state
regulation,
the
anti-preemption
presumption
seems

93. See Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 239 (2d Cir. 2006)
(discussing the two categories of implied preemption); FALLON ET AL., supra note 90, at 646
(distinguishing conflict and field preemption); see also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S.
238, 248 (1984) (“If Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation over the matter in
question, state law is still preempted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law, that is,
when it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law, or where the state law stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”) .
As the Madeira court noted, federal law will not preempt state law under obstacle
preemption analysis unless “the repugnance conflict is so ‘direct and positive’ that the two acts
cannot ‘be reconciled or consistently stand together.’ ” Madeira, 469 F.3d at 241 (citing Jones v.
Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 544 (1977)).
94. Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 92.
95. See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Against Categorical Preemption: Vaccines and the
Compensation Piece of the Preemption Puzzle, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 643, 643–44 (2012) (explaining
the line between preemption categories is not always clear).
96. Daniel Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1, 49 (2013); see also
Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 59 VAND. L. REV.
1501, 1529–52 (2006) (analyzing state court approaches to the interpretation of federal
statutes from 1789 to 1820); Abbe Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from
the Inside—an Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65
STAN. L. REV. 901, 942 (2013) (“There are three basic iterations of the federalism-enforcing
canons, and we inquired about all of them. Two function as presumptions: the eponymous
‘federalism canon,’ which counsels courts to interpret ambiguous federal statutes so as not to
intrude on traditional state functions, and the ‘presumption against preemption,’ the default
principle that courts should not interpret ambiguous federal statutes to preempt state law.”).
97. Bradford R. Clark, Process-Based Preemption, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY,
LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM'S CORE QUESTION 192, 193 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009).
98. Id. at 205.
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appropriate. 99 In the trusts and estates area, the Supreme Court
repeatedly refers and defers to state law, particularly in the transfer
tax area. 100 As the Court noted in 1942, “Grantees under deeds, wills
and trusts, alike, take according to the rule of the state law. The
power to transfer or distribute assets of a trust is essentially a matter
of local law.” 101 Consistent with federalism principles, then, a federal
court might reasonably validate a state law granting a fiduciary
access to digital assets pursuant to lawful consent. 102
Moreover, although the state has no power to compel an ISP to
take an action that is contrary to federal law, where federal law
permits the action and a state then compels it, the two laws can be
interpreted as in harmony. 103 That is, ISPs can comply with state-law
mandates without violating the SCA.
An interesting option for testing these federalism principles
would involve one state enacting the UFADA, with the expectation of
a test case challenging it, in order to resolve what constitutes lawful
consent. 104 This is a risky strategy that might encourage states to
delay enactment of the UFADA and could lead to more uncertainty if
federal courts make conflicting decisions. Pragmatically, state
legislatures do not necessarily coordinate their sessions and
enactments in this manner, so states might not wait for the test case.
Yet, states need to take some action to deal with the increasing
number of estates with digital assets. Following a decision in the test
99. Arizona v. Inter-Tribal Council of Ariz. Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2256 (2013); Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Clark, supra note 97 at 199. Professor Clark
observes that, notwithstanding its rhetorical adherence to the presumption, the Court does not
always apply it. Id.
100. See Mitchell Gans, Federal Transfer Taxation and the Role of State Law: Does the
Marital Deduction Strike the Proper Balance?, 48 EMORY L.J. 871, 872 (1999) (noting that in the
“transfer-tax context,” state law plays a large role, often being “determinative”); Jeffrey
Schoenblum, Strange Bedfellows: The Federal Constitution, Out-of-State Nongrantor
Accumulation Trusts, and the Complete Avoidance of State Income Taxation, 67 VAND. L. REV.
1945 (2014); Langbein, supra note 1 (discussing wealth transfer choice of law issues post
Egelhoff).
101. Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 161 (1962).
102. See Lamm, Thoughts on the SCA, supra note 42 (“I believe that a court would conclude
that state fiduciary laws . . . are not in conflict with and are not preempted by the [SCA].”).
103. See Negro v. Superior Court, No. H040146, 2014 WL 5341926, at *15 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct.
21, 2014) (“Insofar as the Act permits a given disclosure, it permits a court to compel that
disclosure under state law. It follows that when a user has expressly consented to disclosure, the
Act does not prevent enforcement of a subpoena seeking materials in conformity with the consent
given.”).
104. See John Gregory, Fiduciaries’ Access to Digital Assets, SLAW (Jan. 9, 2014), http://
www.slaw.ca/2014/01/09/fiduciaries-access-to-digital-assets/, archived at http://perma.cc/CEF5NWW3 (noting this would not be a “speedy strategy”). This is an issue that appears rarely in
existing state legislative efforts, and thus it merits further attention.
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case, states could simply amend their statutes to establish the
appropriate procedures for ensuring fiduciary access.
C. Private Actions
In addition to, and regardless of, changes in applicable state
and federal laws, the ISPs themselves might address the lawful
consent issue. And estate planners have already begun to do so as
they counsel clients. While these efforts do not resolve potential
federalism issues directly, they provide alternative means for account
holders to articulate their preferences.
Assuming the enforceability of the terms-of-service
agreements, ISPs can add provisions that authorize legally designated
fiduciaries to access electronic communications. The SCA House
Report explicitly notes that this step might be acceptable. 105 Or, ISPs
might establish an opt-in provision, allowing the subscriber to lawfully
consent to fiduciary access. 106 Given the SCA’s deference to the
subscriber, an individual’s affirmative indication of lawful consent—
either through a terms-of-service agreement or in a separate
document (such as a trust or will) 107—should satisfy the SCA. Such an
option also allows the subscriber not just to provide consent but also to
affirmatively withhold consent and thereby preclude fiduciary access.

105. H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 66 (1986), available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/ls/
legislative_histories/pl99-508/houserept-99-647-1986.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/AA5V-Y3B3
(“If conditions governing disclosure or use are spelled out in the rules of an electronic
communication service, and those rules are available to users or in contracts for the provision of
such services, it would be appropriate to imply consent on the part of the user to
disclosures. . . .”).
Of course, this is not spelled out in the statute itself. See also Stephen Breyer, On the
Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 848–61 (1992)
(discussing why legislative history should be used in statutory interpretation); Gluck &
Bressman, supra note 96, at 964–90 (examining the use of legislative history in statutory
interpretation); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 640–66
(1990) (analyzing the new textualism approach to statutory interpretation).
106. Google, for example, has set up an option that allows users to share data from their
account with a trusted contact after a certain period of inactivity. About Inactive Account
Manager, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/3036546?hl=en (last visited Oct.
5, 2014). While not targeted to legally-appointed fiduciaries, it could be used to permit fiduciary
access.
107. For suggested language, see, for example, Lamm et al., supra note 31, at 416–18.
UFADAA allows an account holder to make an affirmative choice in a terms-of-service
agreement that would limit a fiduciary’s access rights, providing that such a choice would
supersede a contrary provision in a governing instrument. UFADAA § 8(b) (2014).
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V. CONCLUSION
Other areas of federal and state law inevitably affect the trusts
and estates field. Because those laws focus on different goals, they do
not always assess and specify their impact on wealth-transfer law. In
an ideal world, the trusts and estates implications would be foremost
(or at least critically important) in legislators’ minds.
Given the number of laws without such explicit recognition of
trusts and estates law, the question is how to proceed. State
legislators, for a variety of reasons, will probably be more responsive
than Congress to such concerns. On the other hand, in the absence of
federal mandates, achieving state uniformity can be difficult. 108 Slight
variations between states lead to undesirable uncertainty for
fiduciaries and for ISPs. Given the difficulty of developing uniformity
and in light of the uncertain applicability of federal law, amendments
to federal legislation would be helpful. This approach ensures
both uniformity and respect for existing and future state law in this
area. It is also preferable to the alternative common law approach,
which is a piecemeal process—even though it should ultimately reach
the same result. Sorting out how digital assets are the same, and how
they differ, from other assets is truly a work in progress.

108. State law may, however, be “even more uniform than federal statutory law that
depends on varied state implementation,” as exemplified by “Uniform Laws.” Abbe Gluck, Our
[National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996, 2022 (2014). As states enact uniform laws, however,
local practice may result in variation in the language. Delaware, for example, which became the
first state to enact UFADAA, based its legislation on an earlier version of the Act. See H.B. 345,
147th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2014).

